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Introduction 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 made the threat of militant jihadi terrorism in the 
United States palpable for many Americans. Since the “9-11 attacks,” terrorism prevention has 
become the top priority for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the evolving homeland 
security enterprise.1 Several deadly terrorist attacks inspired by the swelling global jihadi 
movement have occurred in the U.S. since 2001, but many other plots have been thwarted 
through law enforcement intervention.2 Foiled plots are viewed as victories by the FBI and other 
counterterrorism officials, but important questions still remain regarding the underlying nature of 
these plots and how they are investigated. Convicting individuals on terrorism charges for non-
violent crimes and involvement in underdeveloped terrorism plots has raised concerns. Civil 
rights advocacy groups, for instance, have questioned whether some plots have been largely 
manufactured by law enforcement during sting operations.3 We suggest that underlying this 
concern is the empirical question of how unsuccessful attacks and their plotters compare to 
successful terrorist homicides and their perpetrators. 
To advance our understanding of the nature of thwarted terrorist plots, it is necessary to 
know how they compare to successful, lethal attacks, and how law enforcement uncover jihadi 
terrorist activities in the U.S. In the past, terrorism research has been limited by the unavailability 
of official data sources that are much more common in criminological studies.4 To offset such 
limitations, terrorism researchers have used publicly available data (e.g., media articles and court 
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documents) to collect detailed information about plots, often conducting case studies to 
illuminate terrorist plot dynamics.5 Few studies to date, however, have provided direct 
quantitative comparisons of offender-, incident-, and target-level attributes of unsuccessful and 
successful jihadi plots targeting the U.S.6  
Extending prior research, we comparatively examine several dimensions of unsuccessful 
violent plots (i.e., failed attacks and attacks foiled by the police)7 and successful attacks leading 
to one or more deaths perpetrated by jihadi terrorists in the U.S. between 1990 and 2014. We 
define militant jihadi terrorists as those who adhere to all or part of the following set of beliefs:  
“They believe that only acceptance of Islam promotes human dignity. Islamic extremists 
reject the traditional Muslim respect for ‘‘People of the Book’’ (i.e., Christians and 
Jews). They believe that ‘‘Jihad’’ (i.e., to struggle in God’s path like the Prophet 
Muhammad) is a defining belief in Islam and includes the ‘‘lesser Jihad’’ that endorses 
violence against ‘‘corrupt’’ others. Islamic extremists believe that their faith is oppressed 
in nominally Muslim Middle-Eastern/Asian corrupt governments and in nations (e.g., 
Russia/Chechnya) that occupy Islamic populations. The U.S. is seen as supporting the 
humiliation of Islam, and exploiting the region’s resources. They believe that America’s 
hedonistic culture (e.g., gay rights, feminism, etc.) negatively affects Muslim values. 
Islamic extremists believe that the American people are responsible for their 
government’s actions and that there is a religious obligation to combat this assault. They 
believe that Islamic law—Sharia—provides the blueprint for a modern Muslim society 
and should be forcibly implemented.”8  
 
Our study’s data come from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), an open-source 
database that includes information on extremist and terrorist crimes. The remainder of our study 
is guided by the following general research question: How do offender-, incident-, and target-
specific attributes of jihadi terrorist plots compare across successful and unsuccessful incident 
categories?  
Review of the Literature and Prior Research  
This section provides an overview of the jihadi violence that has threatened America, 
both before and after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and the ushering in of the homeland security era. 
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Our goal is not to provide a complete account of jihadi terrorism either in the U.S. or worldwide, 
but instead to highlight major trends in violent plots against the U.S. We end this section with a 
review of key empirical findings from prior studies examining the nature of jihadi violence.  
 
Jihadi Violence Prior to the 9-11 Attacks 
The threat of jihadi terrorism in the U.S. was mounting in the decade prior to the 9-11 
terrorist attacks.9 In 1990, Jewish Defense League leader Meir Kahane was assassinated in what 
is considered one of the first jihadi homicides on U.S. soil. After delivering a speech to his 
supporters, the Israeli American born rabbi was fatally shot outside of his New York City hotel 
by an Egyptian-born American named El Sayyid Nosair. The assassin disdained Kahane’s 
political views and the moral corruptness of American culture more generally. A few years later, 
a deadlier jihadi homicide occurred when a truck bomb was detonated underneath New York 
City’s World Trade Center, blowing a massive hole in the skyscraper and killing six people. The 
1993 attack was considered only partially successful, as the mastermind of the attack Ramzi 
Yousef and his co-conspirators planned for the tower to collapse into its adjacent “twin” tower, 
to topple them both and kill thousands.10 Other jihadi plots against the U.S. during the 1990s 
were unsuccessful by any definition due to law enforcement intervention. In fact, terrorist 
assassin Nosair was also involved in what is known as the 1993 New York City landmarks plot 
to bomb multiple tunnels, the United Nations Headquarters, the FBI Headquarters, and other 
various targets around the city.11 In this case, the FBI collected ample intelligence that was 
ultimately used to convict several of the conspirators.  
It was during the early 1990s that Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden emerged from the 
Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) as a victorious leader of the volunteer army, or mujahedeen, 
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who had rid the Muslim Afghan territories of communist invaders.12 In 1991, bin Laden became 
enraged when U.S. troops were invited to Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War to help fend off 
a potential invasion by Iraq forces. He considered the presence of Western troops (i.e., infidels) 
on Saudi Arabia’s holiest of grounds humiliating, especially when his own offer to lead 
volunteer forces against the Iraq invasion was rebuffed. Bin Laden became obsessed with 
creating a pan-Islamic Caliphate, ridding the Middle East of corrupt Muslim leaders who were 
operating too closely with Western leaders. To bin Laden, America had become the most hated 
of enemies. Over the next several years, bin Laden continued to strengthen his global terrorist 
network of financiers, strategic and operational managers, and foot soldiers to support his 
international terrorist network known as Al Qaeda. On August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda directed a very 
clear message to the U.S. by attacking their embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania with nearly simultaneous bombings. The truck bombings killed over 200 and injured 
thousands more. Later that year, bin Laden sent a final and futile warning demanding an end to 
the U.S. occupation of the Middle East. Unsatisfied with the government’s response, he issued a 
Fatwa, or legal opinion in Islamic law, ordering Muslims to murder Americans and their allies 
everywhere.13 Despite bin Laden’s warnings, it was not until September 11, 2001 that most 
Americans first learned of Osama bin Laden and his group. On that morning, nineteen hijackers 
armed with box cutters boarded four planes and used them as missiles, ultimately hitting the 
North Tower and South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in 
Arlington, Virginia, and an open field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. In total, nearly 3,000 people 
were killed and hundreds more were injured. In contrast to the 1993 WTC attack, Al Qaeda 
considered the 9-11 attacks exceedingly successful. In 2004, a report was published by members 
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) outlining many 
  5
of the failures that kept the government from connecting the dots prior to the attacks.14 The so-
called 9/11 Commission Report concluded that the FBI failed to thwart the 9-11 plot in large part 
because the agency did not effectively communicate intelligence within its own organization, 
with other American law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and with their foreign 
counterparts. Much of the blame centered on the FBI’s narrow focus on investigations following 
successful terrorist incidents and subsequent terrorism prosecutions before 9-11, as opposed to 
proactively collecting domestic intelligence and intervening in active terrorist plots.15  
The Homeland Security Era 
The government took action to close many of the perceived gaps in domestic intelligence 
even before the 9-11 Commission Report was published. Ushering in a new era of homeland 
security, the U.S. Congress passed the 2002 Homeland Security Act to create the Cabinet-level 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and integrate all of America’s homeland security 
efforts. This represented the largest reorganization of the federal government since consolidating 
all military branches into the Department of Defense following World War II.16 In addition, 
Congress quickly passed the 2001 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (or USA Patriot Act) just days after the 
9-11 attacks.17 The Patriot Act gave new powers for law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
to share raw information, conduct surveillance on personal communications, access personal 
records, conduct secretive searches, and expand what activities are considered terroristic in 
nature. Equipped with these new tools, a revised set of Attorney General Guidelines established 
that preventing terrorism was to become the FBI’s top priority.18 The FBI was reinvented as a 
proactive federal law enforcement agency charged with preventing future acts of terrorism.19 The 
new guidelines removed barriers to opening terrorism inquiries and loosened the reigns on 
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procedures for maintaining domestic terrorism investigations. Since the 9-11 attacks, the 
evolving homeland security enterprise has sought the improvement of intelligence sharing 
capacities among federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.20 The ultimate goal is 
to establish a national network of fusion centers and anti-terrorism taskforces across states and 
major urban areas for sharing and transforming raw information  into actionable intelligence.  
Jihadi Violence Following the 9-11 Attacks 
Despite fundamental changes to the homeland security enterprise, several successful 
jihadi terrorist homicides have occurred on U.S. soil since the 9-11 attacks.21 Most have been 
“lone wolf” attacks, or attacks perpetrated by individuals or small cells operating outside of a 
formal command and control structure.22 For instance, in 2002, the so-called “Beltway Snipers” 
John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo went on a multi-state shooting spree during what 
they perceived as a continuation of the violent jihad started on the morning of the 9-11 terrorist 
attacks. Set on training children to terrorize U.S. cities, Muhammad was eventually found guilty 
of killing in pursuant to the direction or order of terrorism in an ensuing Virginia murder trial.23 
Other high-profile homicides were directly supported or inspired by American-born cleric Anwar 
al-Awlaki, the now deceased operational leader of al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). In 
2009, a U.S. Army psychiatrist named Nidal Hasan went on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood in 
Killeen, Texas, killing 13 people. Communicating with al-Awlaki over email, Hasan became 
increasingly angry over the deaths of Muslims in the Middle East and his own impending 
deployment to Afghanistan. Perpetrators of another high-profile 2013 homicide, Tamerlan and 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, were also influenced by al-Awlaki through his online sermons. The young 
immigrant brothers planted two pressure cooker bombs at the finish line of the Boston Marathon, 
murdering three and injuring more than 200.  
  7
In addition to successful jihadi terrorist attacks, there have been a number of unsuccessful 
terrorist plots that for one reason or another have failed to come to fruition. Recently, an 
increasing number of potential terrorists thwarted by law enforcement have been American-
Muslims who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a media 
savvy al Qaeda splinter group led by Iraqi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. American-Muslims who are 
inspired by ISIS to carry out terrorist attacks in the U.S. remain a top concern of homeland 
security officials.24 The primary way that plots have been thwarted is through contrived 
introductions of FBI informants and undercover agents to persons suspected of being (or 
becoming) radicalized. To counter the threat of violent homegrown extremists, the FBI has 
conducted sting operations, making contact with suspects, and offering them assistance and 
guidance in planning and preparing for terrorist attacks.25 Based on information gathered from 
human intelligence sources, the government has successfully prosecuted a substantial number of 
individuals charged with various federal terrorism offenses, including providing material support 
to terrorists.  
Previous Empirical Findings 
Several things are known about violent jihadi violence from previous empirical research. 
In particular, we know that jihadi terrorists operating in the U.S. are usually male and in their 
mid to late 20s.26 Considering both successful and unsuccessful plots, Kurzman and his 
colleagues27 found that radical Islamic terrorists in the U.S. tend to be Arab Americans (24%), 
though many were also found to be South Asians (16%), Whites (16%), Blacks (15%), and 
African immigrants (13%).28 They also found that about half of unsuccessful terrorists were born 
in the U.S., and 10 percent were in the country illegally.  
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Based on the work of Strom and his colleagues,29 we also know that only a fraction of 
jihadi plots have been successfully executed, with law enforcement thwarting approximately 80 
percent of planned attacks against the U.S. between 1999 and 2009. When considering successful 
and unsuccessful plots together, most have involved conventional weapons, such as bombs and 
firearms, rather than chemical, biological, and other less common weapon types. Other studies30 
have suggested that terrorists’ successes rest largely on factors shaping their opportunities, such 
as gaining access to targets, training, and operational proficiency, while some have suggested 
that the structural makeup of jihadi terrorist operations may shape attack outcomes. For instance, 
Strom et al.31 found that lone wolf terrorists associated with the global jihadi movement have 
been relatively more successful than their group-based counterparts.  
Other studies have focused more attention on understanding the nature of U.S. 
counterterrorism investigations. Tracking temporal patterns of terrorism investigations, Kaplan 
found that the average length of time jihadi terrorists plot their attacks before being intercepted 
by law enforcement (or successfully executing their attack) is approximately 9 months.32 This 
study also found that approximately 95 percent of all terrorist plots last somewhere between 33 
to 750 days before an arrest is made, an attack is attempted, or an attack is successfully executed. 
As for how jihadi plots usually fail, Dahl33 has found that most thwarted plots involve some form 
of law enforcement intervention. He concluded that preventing future terrorism against the U.S. 
was less about connecting the dots and more about conducting good police work. Seeming to 
support his claim, other research has found that nearly 20 percent of terrorist plots have been 
foiled by investigations of routine crimes, while public tips or informants have stopped another 
40 percent of plots.34  
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Despite what we have learned from prior studies, existing gaps in research on jihadi 
violence in the U.S. allow for several contributions to be made. First, few academic studies have 
examined jihadi plots and successful attacks that have occurred in the last several years. Due to 
its evolving nature and the relative infrequency of this type of violence, it is important to 
continuously examine how recent terrorist plots and attacks compare to those of prior years and 
decades. Second, several reports have relied on an analysis of case studies and descriptive 
information on homegrown jihadi violence, but to date there have been few direct empirical 
comparisons of plots and successful fatal attack attributes before and after 9-11. Third, and 
relatedly, we still know little about some of the fundamental attributes of individuals, incident 
circumstances, and targets of jihadi violence in the U.S. For instance, our understanding of how 
social factors, such as marital status, educational attainment, and prior criminal history relate to 
this form of violence is limited. Researchers have begun to examine the weapon use and target 
selection of terrorists, but there is more to learn about other important factors shaping the nature 
of jihadi plots and successful attacks. We need to know more about how plots with specifically 
designated targets compare to those plots that fail to evolve to that stage.  
The purpose of this study is to extend our current understanding of offender- and 
incident-level attributes associated with both successful and unsuccessful homegrown jihadi 
violence. In the next section, we describe the data, case inclusion criteria, and variables included 
in our comparative analysis.  
Data and Method 
Data for this study are extracted from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB),35 an 
open-source, relational incident-, offender-, and target-level database that tracks violent criminal 
activities of extremists operating in and targeting the U.S.36 Common sources of information 
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include advocacy group reports, journalistic accounts, court documents, correctional system 
reports, and scholarly publications, along with other web-based sources. Included in our current 
analysis are violent incidents perpetrated by supporters of al Qaeda, ISIS, and associated Salafist 
terrorist organizations who committed, attempted to commit, or planned to commit ideologically-
motivated acts of violence inside the U.S. between 1990 and 2014.37  
Case Inclusion Criteria 
The unit of analysis for this study is the jihadi violent incident.38 For an incident to be 
included in our study, it had to pass a two-pronged set of inclusion criteria. The first prong 
requires that offenders be indicted for committing a homicide, attempted homicide, or plotting to 
commit a violent crime inside the U.S. during the study’s time frame.39 Unsuccessful attempts to 
commit terrorist violence may consist of either failed or foiled plots. Failed plots include 
attempted homicides, violent incidents set into motion and stopped either by the perpetrator or by 
law enforcement during the final stages of the planned act, whereas foiled plots are stopped 
either through perpetrator desistance or law enforcement action prior to the final stages of the 
planned act.40 Unsuccessful plots are comprised of two categories defined by an intended target’s 
level of specificity. Specific unsuccessful plots are planned acts in which one or more specific 
persons or targets are selected and named. The named victim or target must have identifiable 
spatial and temporal attributes for it to be considered a specific plot. Further, one or more 
offenders must engage in an overt action toward the execution of a specific plot.41 In contrast, 
general unsuccessful plots consist of planned acts in which one or more general types of victims 
or targets (e.g., persons of Jewish descent) are named, but there is no evidence that a specific 
victim or target was selected. In addition, some spatial and temporal characteristics, even if 
vaguely mentioned, for the planned violent act must be known.42 Again, one or more perpetrators 
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must engage in an overt action toward the execution of some aspect of the plot (e.g., purchasing 
weapons) for it to be included in the study. The second prong of our inclusion criteria is 
attitudinal, and requires that one or more of the involved perpetrators subscribe to elements of an 
extremist belief system endorsed by supporters of the global jihadi movement.43  
 
Variable Descriptions 
Two sets of characteristics associated with jihadi homicides and unsuccessful plots are 
extracted directly from the ECDB. We begin, first, by describing a set of offender characteristics, 
including the demographic features of jihadi terrorist offenders as well as other relevant 
background characteristics. The first demographic variable, gender, measures if the offender was 
(1) male or (0) female. Second, we include offender age measured as a continuous variable. The 
next variable measures the race, ethnicity, and pan ethnicity of offenders as belonging to four 
possible groups, including (1) White, (2) Black, (3) Arab, or (4) other.44 The fourth demographic 
variable measures offender marital status as (1) married, (2) divorced/separated, or (3) single.45 
The last group of demographic characteristics measures offender education level as having (1) 
less than a high school diploma, (2) a high school diploma/GED, (3) some college or vocational 
school, or (4) a college degree. Also included in this study is a variable capturing offender 
criminal history, which is measured as (1) evidence of prior arrests or (0) no evidence of prior 
arrests. Additionally, we include a measure of offender citizenship status coded as being (1) a 
U.S. citizen or (0) a non-U.S. citizen. 
The second set of independent variables included in this study at the incident-level 
captures various incident characteristics in addition to the targets or human victims involved in 
jihadi homicides and unsuccessful plots. The first variable is a continuous measure of the number 
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of offenders involved in the homicide or unsuccessful plot. Additionally, we include a 
dichotomous variable that captures whether at least one offender involved in the homicide or 
unsuccessful plot traveled overseas to participate in a foreign conflict or engaged in terrorist 
trainings, measured as (1) evidence of one or more offender traveling overseas or (0) no evidence 
of overseas travel. Next, we examine target/victim type, measured as (1) citizens, (2) 
business/commercial, (3) political/government, (4) military, (5) law enforcement, (6) 
transportation, (7) social minority, or (8) other. The fourth variable captures the weapon type 
used in the homicide or unsuccessful plot, which is measured as (1) bomb, (2) gun, (3) airplane 
or other vehicle, (4) knife/sharp object or (5) other unconventional weapon (e.g., chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons). Lastly, we include a variable for the region where 
the homicide or unsuccessful plot occurred, measured as (1) North, (2) South, (3) West, or (4) 
Midwest.  
Analytic Strategy 
The analysis unfolds in three stages. We begin by presenting a timeline of jihadi terrorist 
homicides and unsuccessful plots from 1990-2014 to situate the current analysis in an historical 
context. In the next two stages, we examine two separate levels of descriptive comparisons 
involving violent jihadi incidents. First, we present descriptive results for offender characteristics 
separately for homicides and unsuccessful plots. In this phase of the analysis, we extract 186 
unique, ideologically motivated jihadi offenders who were arrested for committing a homicide, 
attempted homicide, or plotting to commit a violent crime inside the U.S. (see ECDB inclusion 
criteria above). Also presented are bivariate statistical tests (Chi-square analysis and t-test of 
means) that compare the characteristics of unsuccessful jihadi plot offenders to homicide 
offenders.  
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In the final stage, we examine the features of violent jihadi incidents only (n=271). We 
provide comparative statistics on several incident, target, weapon, and geographic characteristics 
across jihadi homicides and unsuccessful plots, as well as specific and general unsuccessful plot 
categories.46 Additionally, we present the results from bivariate statistical tests (Chi-square 
analysis) comparing unsuccessful plots to homicides.  
Results 
 Homicides and unsuccessful plots perpetrated by jihadi terrorists have occurred 
consistently in the U.S. over the last twenty-five years (see Figure 1). Since 2000, there has been 
at least one violent incident every year, and an average of nearly 11 violent incidents per year, 
reaching a peak of 42 incidents in 2010 (all of which were unsuccessful plots). Before the 9-11 
attacks, an average of less than two violent jihadi terrorist incidents occurred per year, while in 
contrast an average of approximately 18 violent incidents took place yearly between 2001 and 
2014. The least amount of violence occurred between 1995 and 2000. Just two homicides and 
four unsuccessful plots occurred during this time period. Six years later, however, the most 
prolific span of jihadi violence took place from 2006 to 2010, when five homicides and 109 
unsuccessful plots transpired.47  
<<<<<<<<<<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
As shown in Figure 1, the U.S. has seen an increase in homicides, but an even greater increase in 
unsuccessful plots over the past twenty-five years. Indeed, unsuccessful terrorist plots have 
greatly outnumbered homicides, with the last five years experiencing a dramatic increase in the 
rate of unsuccessful to successful terrorist incidents.  
Between 1990 and 2014, New York City and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area 
experienced the largest volume of jihadi violence. In fact, New York City alone saw 20 violent 
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jihadi terrorist incidents involving 61 unique targets, while 13 homicides and unsuccessful plots 
involving 27 targets occurred in or around the Washington D.C. area. We also found jihadi 
terrorist incidents to be widely dispersed across the U.S, with homicides and unsuccessful plots 
occurring in states that include New York, Florida, Michigan, Illinois, Washington, and 
California.  
 
Jihadi Homicides and Unsuccessful Plots Offender Characteristics 
Table 1 presents descriptive findings for several offender characteristics of jihadi 
homicides and unsuccessful plots. Our results indicate that males have committed every lethal 
jihadi attack in the U.S. between 1990 and 2014. Furthermore, homicide offenders are on 
average around 27 years old and proportionately more likely to be Arab and White. Most 
homicide offenders are married (58%) and many have at least some college training (46%).48 
Additionally, nearly 20 percent of homicide offenders have a known prior arrest history and only 
approximately 28 percent are U.S. citizens.  
<<<<<<<<<<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
 Table 1 also presents the results of the bivariate statistical tests (Chi-square analysis and 
t-tests) used to examine differences in offender characteristics between homicides and 
unsuccessful plots. However, it is important to note that due to the limited sample size bivariate 
statistical tests are excluded for some variables with less than five valid cases per cell (see notes 
in Table 1). Comparatively, unsuccessful plot offenders share both similarities and differences 
with jihadi terrorists responsible for lethal attacks. Similar to homicide offenders, unsuccessful 
plot offenders are typically male, though statistically significantly more likely to be slightly older 
(31 years old) than homicide offenders. We also found that unsuccessful plotters are 
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proportionately more likely to be Black and single compared to homicide offenders. With regard 
to education, our findings also show that plotters are relatively less educated than homicide 
offenders. Notably, unsuccessful offenders have significantly more prior arrests on average 
(38%) than homicide offenders (20%). Moreover, unsuccessful plot offenders are significantly 
more likely to be U.S. citizens compared to homicide offenders (52% compared to 28%).  
Jihadi Homicides and Unsuccessful Plots Incident Characteristics 
Table 2 presents characteristics of jihadi homicide incidents, targets/victims, weapons 
used, and geographic locations. We also provide separate columns in the table for homicides 
excluding the Beltway Sniper cases because of their heavy influence on the statistical findings. 
Additionally, we include two separate columns that examine statistics for specific and general 
unsuccessful plots characteristics. Our first variable of interest is number of offenders for which 
we found that approximately 64 percent of all homicides involve multiple offenders, compared to 
nearly 50 percent of unsuccessful plots. Our incident findings also show that approximately 64 
percent of jihadi homicides involved one or more offenders who traveled overseas to participate 
in a foreign conflict or terrorist training.49 As for target characteristics, our results indicate that 
jihadi homicides primarily target citizens (77%). Often referred to as “soft targets,” common 
examples include private individuals, as well as public spaces that are open, accessible, and 
populated by the general public, such as theme parks, shopping malls, movie theatres, and 
various public gatherings. Also noteworthy, other targets include law enforcement (13%) and 
military installations (8%). The most common weapon used in jihadi homicides is a firearm, 
while very few incidents involve the use of bombs.50 In regard to location, nearly 50 percent of 
homicides occurred in the southern region of the U.S.51 
<<<<<<<<<<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>>>>>>>>> 
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Previously alluded to, our descriptive findings vary when the Beltway Sniper spree 
killings are removed from the analysis. In particular, the proportion of homicides involving 
multiple offenders and overseas travelers drops to approximately 42 percent and 38 percent of all 
jihadi homicides, respectively. As for other jihadi homicide characteristics, there are fewer 
disparities in findings when the Beltway Sniper cases are removed from the analysis. One 
notable difference, however, is in homicide location, as the majority of jihadi homicides are 
committed in the northern region of the country (rather than southern region) when these cases 
are excluded. Because of the apparent differences in homicide finding when Beltway Sniper 
incidents are included in our analysis, we focus the next section on the results of the bivariate 
statistical tests used to compare unsuccessful jihadi plots to successful homicides excluding these 
cases. Given the especially unique attributes of this spree killing, this approach makes for the 
most meaningful comparisons.  
As shown in Table 2, we found that the proportion of unsuccessful plots involving more 
than one offender was around 50 percent, while slightly higher than for homicides 
(approximately 42%). On the other hand, only around 23 percent of unsuccessful plots involved 
one or more offenders who traveled overseas, much less than for jihadi homicides. However, 
differences for these variables failed to reach statistical significance. Findings for foreign 
travelers also varied by the type of unsuccessful plot. While 26 percent of plots involving general 
targets were orchestrated by offenders who traveled overseas, less than 16 percent of specific 
plots involved one or more offenders who traveled abroad.52  
Our findings demonstrate major differences in the selection of targets, weapons, and 
attack locations across fatal attacks and unsuccessful plots. Though again, due to the limited 
sample size, bivariate statistical tests are excluded for these variables. Table 2 shows that while 
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over 62 percent of terrorist homicides targeted citizens, this was the case for less than 20 percent 
of plots. Another major difference across fatal and unsuccessful incidents is in the use, or 
intended use, of weapons. Those who were unsuccessful in executing their attack were most 
likely to select bombs as their weapon of choice (67%), especially for those plots with specified 
targets. In contrast, only 8 percent of deadly attacks were executed with bombs. As for where 
violent plots have occurred during the last twenty-five years, unsuccessful plots have been spread 
more evenly across the country in comparison to homicides. While the Midwest region of the 
country has been spared from deadly jihadi terrorist attacks to date, approximately 17 percent of 
unsuccessful plots have originated from this region.  
Discussion 
Despite the rarity of attacks in the U.S., the threat of jihadi terrorism remains a real and 
ongoing threat to U.S. homeland security. Countering this violent threat will undoubtedly be the 
FBI’s top priority for years to come. An unfortunate reminder of the threat posed by jihadi 
terrorists came when an American Muslim man and his Pakistani-born wife swore allegiance to 
ISIS on social media before embarking on a shooting rampage, killing 14 and seriously 
wounding 22 others, in San Bernardino, California.53 We also know that many Americans have 
joined or attempted to join others from around the world in pledging allegiance to, and 
sometimes traveling to join, militant jihadi groups such as ISIS.54 Judging from the anecdotal 
evidence of recent attacks, becoming radicalized and communicating with foreign jihadists over 
the Internet will likely continue. Also a grave concern, some fear that the American 
government’s involvement in foreign conflicts across the Middle East will continue to trigger 
“lone wolf” attacks in the U.S.55 This fear recently came to life in 2014 when 29-year-old 
American Ali Muhammad Brown went on a cross-country murder spree in retaliation for the 
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actions of the U.S. government in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A New Jersey native with a 
number of serious prior crimes, Brown claimed that the killing of four male victims in three 
homicide incidents was justified because the U.S. military routinely kills innocent people in the 
Middle East.56 
 While studying successful attacks can tell us about the nature of militant jihadi terrorism, 
consider again that one of the key purposes of this study was to examine how unsuccessful 
terrorism plots compared to successful terrorist homicides. Specifically, we set out to learn if law 
enforcement and intelligence officials were thwarting violent jihadists who were demonstrably as 
capable of executing lethal attacks against the U.S. as those who were able to fully execute their 
deadly plans. Before reviewing the key findings of our study, let us assume for a moment that we 
found no differences between lethal attacks and thwarted plots other than their ultimate 
successfulness. Two implications would necessarily follow. First, the increasing threat of jihadi 
terrorism against the U.S. in the 21st century would be astounding. Indeed, the number of “near 
misses” for New York City, Washington D.C., and the nation more generally would be 
extremely troubling. Second, if failed plotters and successful attackers were truly cut from the 
same cloth, then we would conclude that law enforcement has been successful in keeping 
society’s most dangerous at bay.  
Importantly, though, our comparison of failed plotters to those who have been more 
successful at executing attacks in the U.S. suggests a more complex story. For instance, we 
found terrorist plotters in the U.S. to be proportionately more likely to be U.S. citizens who have 
no prior history of traveling overseas to train or fight in foreign conflicts. Plotters also plan to 
terrorize several different types of targets and are disproportionately interested in using bombs in 
their attacks compared to homicide offenders who rely more on firearms. Further, plotters who 
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only have a general idea of possible targets are unique in some important ways. For example, 
general target plots have been disproportionately more common in the last few years compared 
to earlier time periods. Perpetrators of less developed plots are also proportionately the most 
likely to be young, White, U.S. citizens who lack overseas training and fighting experiences, and 
who often intend to generally target the U.S. military in some capacity. One explanation for these 
incongruities is in possible underlying differences between jihadi plotters and successful 
homicide offenders. Plotters may be enthusiastic supporters of the global jihadi movement, but 
they might lack the knowledge, skills and sophistication needed to stage and execute a successful 
terrorist attack in the U.S. It is also possible that unsuccessful plotters simply lack the 
opportunities and resources that would be required to pull off attacks at the scale to which they 
desire.  
At the same time, it is possible that some of the differences we found between 
unsuccessful and successful jihadists might be due to changes in law enforcement responses to 
terrorism. As discussed, preventing terrorism became the FBI’s top priority after the 9/11 
attacks.57 Several important changes in protocols and federal legislation granted law enforcement 
and intelligence officials’ new tools for investigating terrorism in the U.S. The passage of the 
USA Patriot Act and the revisions to the U.S. Attorney General Guidelines in 2002 and 2008 
gave FBI agents increased discretion in investigating leads, making inquiries, and monitoring 
terrorist suspects’ communications for longer periods of time. Importantly, after 9-11, it became 
unnecessary for individuals to commit violence or even intend to commit violence to be 
officially considered terrorists.  
Because of changes in investigatory protocol and the law, jihadi terrorism has been 
approached qualitatively differently in the 21st century. Investigatory changes have likely 
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resulted in differences in the types of incidents and persons investigated for terrorism by 
widening the net on the types of actors and activities officially labeled as terrorism-related. 
Equipped with new tools for investigation, the FBI has relied heavily on the use of confidential 
informants (CIs) and undercover agents (UAs) to thwart terrorism plots, sometimes before there 
was a clear and imminent threat of violence to the public.58 More specifically, our data show that 
federal law enforcement, usually the FBI, was involved in investigating over 90 percent of all 
successful and unsuccessful jihadi incidents, while state and local law enforcement were 
involved in substantially fewer investigations. Forty-two percent of the unsuccessful plots 
examined in this study relied on federal undercover agents. In addition, we found that even more 
unsuccessful plot cases involved the use of confidential informants, over 64 percent.  
As one example, consider the 2014 investigation arrest of Nicholas Teausant, a 20-year-
old White male community college student, who was suspected of plotting to bomb the Los 
Angeles subway system on or around New Years Eve.59 A heavy social media user,60 Teausant 
caught the attention of federal officials after posting messages on an Instagram account 
expressing his wish to join Allah’s army. He had made friends over the Internet that encouraged 
him in his jihad, one of which being an informant for the FBI. Eventually, plans to target the Los 
Angeles subway were called off when Teausant was spooked by the arrest of another unrelated 
terrorist plotter who had unknowingly befriended an FBI informant over Facebook. Teausant 
was later arrested when attempting to enter Canada, which is where he intended to depart from 
on his way to join Allah’s army in Syria. He now faces 15 years in prison for charges of 
attempting to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization. During his 
adjudication, the young, socially alienated man with no established ties to terrorist groups 
claimed that he had no recollection of the subway plot and that if it were not for the 
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encouragement of the FBI informant he would not have sought to travel overseas. Nonetheless, 
the government was able to easily establish a predisposition to commit terrorism based on the 
defendant’s social media posts, while entrapment defenses have to date been futile in terrorism-
related cases. The virtue of using government informants to encourage and further terrorist plots 
remains debatable, but heterogeneity in the nature of jihadi terrorism is not. In the end, we are 
less certain of whether or not terrorists thwarted by law enforcement and intelligence officials are 
the same breed of terrorists who successfully execute attacks against the U.S. Based on several 
of the findings from the current study, there are reasons to doubt that this is the case.   
The challenge for law enforcement personnel and other officials is to continue to work to 
increase the number of failed plots and decrease the number of successful plots. There are 
several potential avenues that might be pursued. First, tips and leads provided from citizens and 
informants are critical to preventing terrorism acts. The goal has to be to focus on continuing to 
encourage widespread cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 
and, importantly, inform citizens about the need to provide information when they come across 
suspicious circumstances all the while continuing to build trust in Muslim American 
communities. Local police agencies maintain a wealth of knowledge about their community and 
come across facts and circumstances in their daily operations, whether it is on a traffic stop or 
when responding to a call for service. In cooperation with the FBI, it would make sense for local 
police to more proactively engage with the families and communities that often become the focus 
of terrorist probes. Principles of community policing are well established in most communities 
now, and there continues to be a real need for bridge building with Muslim American 
communities. Moreover, local agencies routinely interact with mental health providers, school 
officials, business leaders, clergy members, and others who might have information useful for 
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evaluating risk and investigatory decision-making. Second, studies like this one should help law 
enforcement begin to understand what works and what is promising from an investigation 
standpoint. The study is limited in that it only provides preliminary insights and there remains a 
significant need to better understand the nuances of terrorism investigations. Relatedly, such 
studies will help policymakers and law enforcement officials better establish priorities. Law 
enforcement resources are inherently limited and many terrorism investigations are time 
consuming and require considerable personnel resources. Thus, more study of these issues with 
additional data might lead to the development of the types of risk assessment tools that analysts 
can use to prioritize targets. Comparative analysis of data on certain attributes, including 
offenders’ prior overseas travel, citizenship, age, and choices of weapons and targets, can help to 
establish priorities and assess the radicalization of targets using human intelligence and cyber-
intelligence, saving considerable time and effort and ensuring that top threats are managed.   
Our study is of course not without limitations. As we only examined jihadi plots and 
attacks that occurred at least in part on U.S. soil, research on terrorist violence will benefit 
greatly from cross-national comparisons across both Western and non-Western nations. 
Knowledge about jihadi terrorism can also be advanced in the future by comparatively 
examining these incidents with other forms of non-violent terrorism and terrorism committed by 
other types of domestic extremists. The uniqueness of militant jihadi violence will become 
clearer when we better understand how this form of violence is similar and different to, for 
instance, financial terrorism and terrorist homicides perpetrated by domestic far-right extremists. 
How jihadists who intend to travel overseas compared to those who seek to attack targets within 
the U.S. is also a worthy topic of research. Finally, the number of jihadi homicides included in 
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our analysis limits our study. Due to the relatively low number of homicides, cases involving 
multiple victims had a disproportionate influence on our findings that needed to be addressed.  
Conclusion  
Since 9/11, an exorbitant amount of resources has been directed toward preempting the 
next act of jihadi terrorism. Though a number of deadly incidents have occurred on U.S. soil, 
many more have been thwarted by law enforcement. Again, critical to understanding if terrorist 
killers and failed plotters are cut from the same cloth, we need to know more about how 
successful homicides and unsuccessful plots compare. Our findings showed that thwarted plots 
are unique from homicides in several ways, including the intended weapons and the targets that 
were chosen by terrorists. We interpreted these findings in part by pointing to possible 
differences in the levels of sophistication and available resources for plotters, as well as 
important differences in how terrorism has been investigated after revisions were made to the 
Attorney General Guidelines and the passage of the USA Patriot Act. While our study 
contributes to an empirical foundation for understanding jihadi terrorism and counterterrorism 
activities, it is our hope that future research will further advance knowledge about the nuanced 
threat of unsuccessful terrorist plots against the U.S.  
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Table 1. Jihadi Terrorist Offender Characteristics (n=186) 
 
 
All Violence 
(n=186) 
 
All Homicides  
(n=52) 
 
Unsuccessful 
Plotsa  
(n=134) 
 
 
% or Mean 
 
% or Mean 
 
% or Mean 
 
Male 
 
97.80 
 
100.00 
 
97.00 
 
Age 30.31 (avg.) 
 
27.76 (avg.) 
 
  31.26 (avg.)* 
 
Race/Pan ethnicity   
  White 16.90 22.20 14.90 
  Black 22.30 15.60 24.80 
  Arab 56.60 62.20 56.60 
  Other 4.20 --- 5.80 
 
Marital Status 
 
  
  Married 49.50 58.30 46.80 
  Divorced/Separated 13.60 16.70 12.70 
  Single 36.90 25.00 40.50 
  
Education 
 < High School 11.20 11.50 11.10 
  High School Diploma 20.20 3.80 27.00 
  Some College  38.20 46.20 34.90 
  College Degree 30.30 38.50 27.00 
 
Prior Arrests 
 
33.30 20.40 38.10* 
 
U.S. Citizen 45.40 28.00   51.90** 
*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p ≤ .001 
a To statistically compare Unsuccessful Plots to All Homicides, t-test of means is used for 
continuous variables (e.g., age) while Chi-square (X2) analysis is used for all remaining 
categorical variables. Statistical analysis was not conducted for variables with less than 5 
valid cases per cell, including Race/Pan ethnicity, Marital Status, and Education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Jihadi Terrorist Incident Characteristics (n=271) 
 
 
All Violence 
(n=271) 
All Homicides  
(n=39) 
Homicides 
Excluding D.C. 
Sniper (n=24) 
Unsuccessful 
Plotsa  
(n=232) 
Specific 
Unsuccessful 
Plots (n=162) 
General 
Unsuccessful 
Plots (n=70) 
 % or Mean % or Mean % or Mean % or Mean % or Mean % or Mean 
 
Multiple Offenders 
 
51.70 
 
64.10 
 
41.70 
 
49.6 
 
50.0 
 
48.6 
 
1 or More Offenders 
Travelled Overseas 
 
29.20 
 
63.90 
 
38.10 
 
22.60 26.00 15.90 
 
Target Type 
 
 
 
 
  
  Citizens 28.10 76.90 62.50 19.90 14.30 32.90 
  Business/Commercial 10.40 --- --- 12.10 13.00 10.00 
  Political/Government 11.10 --- --- 13.00 16.80 4.30 
  Military 15.20 7.70 12.50 16.50 14.30 21.40 
  Law Enforcement 9.60 12.80 20.80 9.10 10.60 5.70 
  Transportation 10.00 --- --- 11.70 15.50 2.90 
  Social Minority 6.70 2.60 4.20 7.40 5.00 12.90 
  Other 8.90 --- --- 10.40 10.60 10.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Weapon Type 
  Bomb 57.80 5.10 8.30 67.30 72.30 56.50 
  Gun 31.30 71.80 54.20 24.00 17.60 37.10 
  Airplane/Vehicle 4.30 12.80 20.80 2.80 3.40 1.40 
  Knife/Sharp Object 5.10 10.30 16.70 4.10 4.70 2.90 
  Other 1.60 --- --- 1.80 2.00 1.40 
 
Region     
  North 32.50 25.60 41.70 33.80 35.10 29.50 
  South 37.20 48.70 20.80 34.90 33.80 38.60 
  West 15.80 25.60 37.50 13.80 14.60 11.40 
  Midwest 14.50 --- --- 17.40 16.60 20.50 
*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p ≤ .001 
a Statistical comparisons (Chi-square (X2) analysis) are only conducted between Unsuccessful Plots and Homicides Excluding D.C. Sniper categories. 
Statistical analysis was not conducted for variables with less than 5 valid cases per cell, including Target Type, Weapon Type, and Region. All remaining 
variables in Table 2 are not statistically significant at the bivariate level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
